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Abstract: We compare the dynamics of inflation and bond yields leading up to a sovereign debt 
crisis in settings where asset markets are frictionless to other settings with financial frictions. As 
compared with the case with frictionless asset markets, an asset market structure with financial 
frictions generates a significant delay in the response of prices to news about a future debt crisis. 
With complete markets, prices jump in response to news about the possibility of a future debt 
crisis. However, when short selling of government bonds is restricted, some agents can’t act on 
their beliefs, and prices don’t respond to the news. Instead, prices only move in periods 
immediately prior the crisis. 
 
JEL classification: E31, E62, H60 
 
Key words: sovereign debt crisis, deflation, fiscal risk, leverage, borrowing constraint 1 Introduction
Recently, many developed countries have faced serious government debt problems in the midst
of severe and persistent economic contractions. It is a politically dicult task for a government
to increase taxes or lower purchases and engineer a scal consolidation. For a government
that fails to generate a scal consolidation the alternative is default. Default can arise in one
of two ways. One way is to suspend payments on its debt. Most sovereign debt is nominally
denominated. This opens the door to a second form of implicit default. High in
ation reduces
the real value of outstanding government debt. We refer to either of these forms of default as
a sovereign debt crisis.
How does news about the possibility of a future debt crisis aect prices today? Under the
assumptions of rational expectations and complete markets, prices will respond instantly to
the news. This result is at odds with what we see in some major economies. In Japan the
gross debt-GDP ratio has risen from 60 percent to over 200 percent and yet the yield curve is

at and the price level is falling. In the United States government debt has also risen sharply
and yet bond yields are low and in
ation is muted.
The fact that prices have not responded is comforting to policy makers. On the one hand,
sharp increases in yields and/or in
ation can be a powerful impetus for the scal authority
to get its house in order. On the other hand, if prices don't respond, there is a tendency for
policy makers to perceive that the problem is not severe and to kick the can down the road.
The fact that prices are not responding today does not mean that there is not a signicant
risk of a future default. The objective of this paper is to use a model to make this point
explicit. We show that the asset market structure plays a crucial role in determining how
prices respond to an increase in the risk of a debt crisis. If markets are complete prices respond
sharply and immediately to news about a prospective debt crisis. However, the response of
prices can be delayed when nancial frictions are modeled. News about the prospect of a
future crisis has no impact on current prices. Instead prices increase sharply only shortly
before the crisis event.
We consider two models: one where default is implicit and another where default is explicit.
The particular model of implicit default we consider is a variant of the scal theory of the price
level (FTPL) studied, for instance, by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), Cochrane
(2001), and Bassetto (2002), among others. Following the convention of this literature, we
suppose that the government sets a sequence of real tax revenue as well as a sequence of
nominal interest rates. In equilibrium the price level adjusts to satisfy the government's 
ow
budget constraint in every period. For simplicity, we consider a nite horizon model in which
the government collects taxes only in the last period. The amount of taxes collected in the
2last period are either high, TH, or low, TL. The equilibrium price level in the last period is
higher when the taxes collected in that period are smaller. We choose TL be so small that the
equilibrium in
ation rate is very large when the TL event occurs and refer to this outcome as
a sovereign debt crisis.
Our model of beliefs and market structure builds on previous research by Geanakoplos
(2003, 2010). Individuals have dierent beliefs about the probability of a debt crisis. When
a debt crisis occurs, the in
ation rate rises and, as a result, the ex-post real rate of return on
government bonds falls. Thus, individuals who believe that the probability of a scal crisis is
low are relatively optimistic about the rate of return on government bonds.
We examine the dynamics of the in
ation rate under two asset market structures. The rst
structure is frictionless asset markets. Agents trade a complete set of contingent claims. In
the second market structure contingent claims are not traded. Agents can borrow to purchase
government debt, but short selling of government debt is ruled out. In the complete markets
specication both optimistic and pessimistic agents can freely bet on their beliefs. Relatively
optimistic agents buy the Arrow security which pays o in a state without a crisis and sell
the Arrow security which pays o in a state with a crisis. Relatively pessimistic agents make
the opposite trades.
In the second asset market structure, however, there is asymmetry between optimistic
and pessimistic agents. On the one hand, optimistic agents borrow as much as possible to
purchase government bonds. This transaction is similar to purchasing the Arrow security
that pays o in the no crisis event. On the other hand, since government bonds cannot be
short sold by assumption, there is no transaction that allows one to mimic the purchase of
an Arrow security that pays o if there is a crisis. Pessimistic agents are not able to bet on
their beliefs and lend to optimistic individuals instead.
The two asset market structures have very dierent implications for the dynamics of the
in
ation rate. If asset markets are frictionless news about the possibility of a future debt
crisis gets immediately re
ected in the price level and the in
ation rate jumps up in the
initial period. In subsequent periods the in
ation rate remains high along the path leading
to the debt crisis. In other words, there is a kind of in
ation smoothing when asset markets
are frictionless.
In our setup with nancial frictions the reaction of the initial price level to news about
the possibility of a future debt crisis is very small. In fact, in some of our examples the price
response is indistinguishable from zero. Instead the in
ation rate only increases in states that
occur immediately prior to the crisis event. A nal distinction is that the response of the
in
ation rate in the crisis state is much larger when there are nancial frictions.
3The intuition for this result is simple. When asset markets are frictionless both optimistic
and pessimistic agents can bet on their beliefs. In the presence of nancial frictions, however,
only optimistic individuals can do so. This results in a higher real price of government bonds
and a lower in
ation rate.
We also consider a setup with long-term debt and an exogenous price level. This is meant
to capture the situation for a country such as Greece that is a member of a currency union.
The results are very similar. In the complete markets specication with no nancial frictions
the yield on long-term debt jumps immediately in response to news about a future default.
In the leverage specication, in contrast, the response of the yield curve to the same news is
about zero. The yield on long-term debt does eventually rise but only immediately before the
crisis event.
2 Motivation for the model
One of the most important implications of forward looking behavior is that news about future
events in
uences actions and the price system today. In the context of our model, news that
the risk of a debt crisis has gone up should result in price increases today. In Section 3 we
will demonstrate this point with a formal model. Before discussing the model we rst provide
some empirical evidence that suggests that price responses to news is delayed.
A variety of papers have provided evidence that sovereign debt crises are predictable.
Rheinhart and Rogo (2010) nd that the probability of a future sovereign debt crisis increases
for countries that experience banking crises and large increases in government and external
debt. Nieto Parra (2008) nds that investment banks demand higher underwriting fees as
much as three years in advance of sovereign debt crises.
Bond yields, however, do not appear to respond contemporaneously. For intance, in Nieto
Parra's (2008) sample of 29 emerging countries running from 1993 to 2006, bond risk premia
for crisis countries are somewhat elevated but stable in the 5 year period leading up to the
crisis and don't respond to higher underwriting fees.
In
ation also does not appear to react contemporaneously to higher public decits. Bas-
setto and Butters (2010) report empirical evidence on the contemporaneous correlation of
public decits with in
ation using a sample of OECD countries that extends from 1970-
2009.1. They nd no evidence that high public decits are associated with higher in
ation
rates using their \corrected" measure of the decit.2
1Their sample excludes some countries that experienced crises such as Mexico and Turkey.
2They adjust the standard denition of the decit to recognize savings that accure to the government when
4Figure 1 reports debt-GDP ratios, the in
ation rate, and short and long-term interest
rates for 3 sets of country pairs. Korea is plotted with Japan, Canada is plotted with the U.S.
and Germany is plotted with Greece.3 The reason for these choices of parings can be seen by
comparing the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio in each country paring. Japan has seen the
debt-GDP ratio rise from 50 percent in 1988 to over 180 percent in 2009. This debt-GDP is
very high relative to other advanced economies. In Korea, in contrast, the debt-GDP ratio is
very low. It gradually rises during the sample from a low of 13 percent in 1988 but is less than
32 percent in 2010. Recent research by Imrohoroglu and Sudou (2010) and Braun and Joines
(2011) suggests that the current trajectory of government debt in Japan is unsustainable. If
one accepts this view then there are four distinct ways that a scal consolidation could occur:
higher real growth, a scal consolidation produced by higher taxes and/or lower government
spending, higher in
ation that devalues the real value of outstanding government liabilities
or a payments suspension. What is surprising about Japan is that in spite of a near tripling
in the debt-GDP ratio, there is no evidence of an uptick in either in
ationary pressure or the
yield curve. Yields on long-term bonds are falling throughout that sample and the economy
has seen the in
ation rate fall as the debt-GDP ratio increased and now nds itself in a
situation with de
ation. Observe also that both long-term bond yields and the in
ation rate
are lower in Japan than Korea, a country with a much stronger scal situation.
A similar picture emerges if we compare the U.S. with Canada. Between 2007 and 2010
the U.S. has seen the debt-GDP ratio increase from 36 percent to 61 percent. Canada also
experiences an increase. The debt-GDP ratio rises from 25 percent in 2007 to 36 percent in
2009 but then stabilizes at about that level in 2010. One might expect that the large increase
in U.S. indebtedness in conjunction with diculties in legislating either higher taxes or lower
government expenditures would lead agents to assign a higher probability to either an explicit
payment suspension or higher in
ation in the U.S as compared to Canada. However, as the
plots in Figure 1 reveal, the evolution of in
ation and long-term bond yields in the U.S. in
Canada are virtually identical.
If markets assign very low or even zero probability to either explicit default or implicit
default via in
ation in the U.S. and Japan prices may not respond. It is thus also useful to
consider an industrialized country which has experienced a debt crisis.
Consider the plots of Germany and Greece. In
ation rates are low in both countries after
they switch to the Euro and remain low through the end of 2010. Galati, Heemeijer and
debt is nominally denominated and there is in
ation.
3Our basic source for this data is OECD. In some cases this data has been supplemented with data from the
IMF, the Bank of Japan and Bank of Greece. More details on our data sources can be found in the Appendix.
5Mossner (2011) nd evidence that in
ation expectations respond to increases in sovereign
default risk in 2009 and 2010. However, these beliefs cannot be seen in in
ation rates in
Greece and Germany which remain low.
Between 2000 and 2007 the debt-GDP ratio in Greece was averaging a bit over 100 percent.
This compared with a debt-GDP ratio in Germany of about 40 percent. In spite of this
dierence, the risk premium on Greek long term bonds was only 25 basis points on average
between 2002 and 2007. Greece saw its debt-GDP ratio increase from 106 percent in 2007 to
148 percent in 2010. In December of 2008 the spread on long-term Greek debt over German
debt rose above 2 percent for the rst time since the Euro was founded. A bit more than 16
months later Greece requested funds from the EU/IMF in April of 2010.
This concentration of the price increases in states close to the crisis event also occurred
in Argentina. Lau (2003) estimates one year ahead default probabilities for Argentina using
credit default swap data and nds that the probability of default only starts rising in October
of 2000 which was about 2 months prior to the IMF package which, was approved in December
of 2000, and 15 months prior to its default in January of 2001.
Overall, this evidence raises the possibility of a disconnect between risk and price move-
ments. In early periods as the risk of a future debt crisis increases price responses appear
to be muted or even zero. Even though there are early indications that the probability of a
debt crisis is increasing, prices only appear to react at most 12-16 months before the crisis.
Our aim here is to formalize a specic explanation for these observations. We will next turn
to illustrate that modeling nancial frictions can have a rst order impact on the timing and
size of in
ation and yield curve responses to a debt crisis.
3 Two-period model
A central message of this paper is that the market structure has rst order implications for
the dynamics of the in
ation rate. To illustrate this point we will characterize the competitive
equilibrium under three dierent asset market structures. After that we will describe how the
equilibrium in
ation rate varies across them when agents begin to expect a debt crisis.
Our model is an exchange economy in which all agents consume a single consumption
good in each period. To make our arguments more transparent we follow the example of the
literature on the scal theory of the price level and abstract from money. The price level
is determined as the relative price of the consumption good and the (nominal) government
bond.
To make the exposition of the model more transparent to the reader we begin by consider-
6ing a two-period version of the model. Then in Section 4 we generalize the model to allow for
an arbitrary number of time periods. Periods are indexed by t = 0;1. There are two states
of nature in period 1, U and D. As discussed below, they are distinguished by the amount of
taxes collected by the government. In this two period model the event D will be associated
with low taxes and a debt crisis. We let st denote the state of nature in period t, where s0 = 0
and s1 2 S  fU;Dg.
Individuals: There is a continuum of agents indexed by h 2 [0;1]. Each agent receives an
identical endowment of yt units of the consumption good in period t = 0;1. Note that the
endowment does not depend on the state in period 1. Agents are also endowed with equal
amounts of nominal government debt,  B > 0, in period zero. All agents have access to a
risk-free storage technology that oers a gross rate of return denoted by R > 1.
Agents are identical except for their beliefs about the probability that state U occurs in
period 1. Specically, we assume that agent h believes that s1 = U with probability h. Thus,
agents with high h assign less probability to the debt crisis event. All agents have linear











h; for s1 = U,
1   h; for s1 = D.
Government: The government starts o with  B > 0 nominal liabilities to the private sector,
collects taxes and issues one-period bonds. We abstract from government consumption and
assume that taxes are lump sum and identical across agents. Neither of these assumptions are
essential to our arguments. Let T0 and T(s1) denote the real amount of taxes in period 0 and
in state s1 2 S of period 1, respectively. Let B0 be the nominal amount of bonds issued by
the government in period 0 and q0 2 (0;1] be the price of those bonds. Given these denitions
the \
ow budget constraints" of the government in period 0 and in state s1 2 S of period 1
7are given by4
 B = P0T0 + q0B0; (2)
B0 = P(s1)T(s1); s1 2 S; (3)
where P0 and P(s1) are the price levels in period 0 and in state s1, respectively.
We will refer to the government's choice of fT0;fT(s1)gs12Sg as its scal policy, and its
choice of the one-period nominal interest rate 1=q0 as its monetary policy. Given a particular
choice of the nominal interest rate, the amount of government bonds issued in period 0, B0,
is determined so as to satisfy demands from the private sector.
We assume that the government collects taxes in the following fashion:
T0 = 0; (4)
T(s1) =
(
TH; if s1 = U,
TL; if s1 = D,
(5)
where TH  TL > 0. We assume that the amount of taxes collected by the government is
very small in state D in period 1. This explains our use of the expression \debt crisis" to refer
to this state. Thus a government policy is given by (q0;TH;TL) 2 (0;1]  R2
++. We assume
that government policy is exogenous.
3.1 Complete markets
Let us begin by considering a setting with complete markets and no trading frictions. We will
subsequently refer to this as the complete markets specication. Suppose that a complete set
of one period contingent claims (Arrow securities) are traded in period 0. Let q(s1) denote
the price of an Arrow security that pays o one unit of account in period 1 if and only if s1
occurs.
Each agent h 2 [0;1] maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraints:



















+ y1   T(s1); s1 2 S; (7)
c0;k0;b0;c(s1)  0; s1 2 S; (8)
4Here we refer to (2)-(3) as the 
ow budget constraints of the government. But, as is well known, in the
standard formulation of the scal theory there is ambiguity about exactly what constraints the government
faces. Bassetto (2002) posits a game theoretic version of the scal theory that removes this ambiguity. It is
straightforward to rewrite our model in the same way as Bassetto (2002).
8where k0 is the amount goods stored in period 0, b0 is the amount of government bonds
purchased in period 0, and fb(s1)gs12S are the amounts of Arrow securities purchased in
period 0. Notice that (8) imposes a short selling restriction on government debt. Given that
agents have access to a complete set of one period Arrow securities this restriction doesn't
matter in this setting. Having described the agent's problem we can now dene a competitive
equilibrium.
Denition 1 (Complete Markets Competitive Equilibrium). Given a government policy




0, [bh(s1)]s12Sgh2[0;1], supply of government bonds B0, and prices fP0, [P(s1)]s12S,




[bh(s1)]s12Sg solves her utility maximization problem; (ii) the government 
ow budget con-






0)dh = y0; (9)
Z 1
0








0 dh = B0; (11)
Z 1
0
bh(s1)dh = 0; s1 2 S: (12)
We now turn to provide a characterization of the complete markets equilibrium. In this
setting both storage and the government bond are redundant assets. Since the government




q(s1) = q0: (13)
Similarly, since one unit of goods put into storage in period 0 yields R units of goods in all





R = 1; (14)
when storage occurs in equilibrium.
It follows from these observations that the 
ow budget constraints (6)-(7) can be combined





















9and the agent's problem can be restated as maximizing (1) subject to (15). Since R > 1 our
preference structure implies that no one consumes in period 0:
ch









It follows from (14) that h0 is between 0 and 1, and that




Then we see that h0 is the marginal agent in the sense that agents h > h0 make dierent
choices than agents with h < h0. Agents with h > h0 are optimistic and choose ch(U) = 0.
Agents with h < h0 are pessimistic and choose ch(D) = 0.











; s1 2 S: (19)
Using the no-arbitrage condition (13), we can combine the 
ow budget constraints (2)-(3) to



















Note that this equation determines P0 given h0.
Next we use the market clearing restrictions to determine the identity of the marginal
















= Ry0 + y1:
10Thus (15) can be rewritten as
Rc0 + h0c(U) + (1   h0)c(D)  Ry0 + y1:




h0(Ry0 + y1); for h > h0,




0; for h > h0,
1
1 h0(Ry0 + y1); for h  h0.
(22)
Market clearing implies












Finally, the Arrow security prices q(s1) are determined by solving
q(s1)P(s1)
P0 R = 1
2 for each
s1 2 S. The next proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1. In the two period model with complete asset markets, (i) the equilibrium
consumption allocation fch
0;[ch(s1)]s12Sgh2[0;1] is given by (16), (21), and (22), where the
marginal agent h0 = 1
2; and (ii) the equilibrium price levels fP0;[P(s1)]s12Sg are given by
(19) and (20).
One implication of this proposition is that the consumption allocation is independent of
government policy or in other words Ricardian equivalence obtains. In the other two market
structures we consider Ricardian equivalence fails.
3.2 No borrowing
Now suppose that Arrow securities are no longer traded, so that government bonds and storage
are the only assets available to agents. It follows that these assets are no longer redundant.
Since there are two assets (storage and government bonds) and two states (U and D) asset
markets are still complete. However, we now rule out borrowing. Moreover, our previous
assumption that short selling of government debt is prohibited is no longer innocuous. These
nancial frictions imply that the competitive equilibrium in this specication is not Pareto
Optimal whereas the equilibrium considered in the previous subsection is Pareto Optimal.
For these reasons we will refer to this new setup as the no-borrowing specication.
11Budget constraints for each agent are now given by







c(s1)  Rk0 +
b0
P(s1)
+ y1   T(s1); s1 2 S; (24)
c0;k0;b0;c(s1)  0; s1 2 S: (25)
Each agent maximizes (1) subject to these constraints.
Denition 2 (No-borrowing Competitive Equilibrium). Given a government policy (q0, TH,




0gh2[0;1], supply of government bonds B0, and prices fP0, [P(s1)]s12Sg such that (i) for each
agent h 2 [0;1], fch
0, [ch(s1)]s12S, kh
0, bh
0g solves her utility maximization problem; (ii) the
government 
ow budget constraints (2)-(3) are satised, where taxes fT0;[T(s1)]s12Sg are
given by (4)-(5); and (iii) all markets clear, i.e., equations (9)-(11) hold.
Consider the utility maximization problem of agent h 2 [0;1]. Once again no agent will
choose to consume in period 0: ch
0 = 0 for all h 2 [0;1]. Each agent will hold only the asset
that oers her the highest expected return. Let h0 2 [0;1] be the agent who is indierent
between government bonds and storage. We refer to this agent as the marginal buyer. The












where the left-hand side is the real rate of return on government bonds, and the right-hand
side the real rate of return on storage. Agents with h > h0 have optimistic beliefs about
the return on government bonds and only hold government bonds. Agents with h < h0, on
the contrary, are pessimistic about the return on government bonds and hold no government
bonds at all. Thus, the solution to the utility maximization problem can be summarized as
follows:
ch




0; h > h0;
 B













; h > h0;




















+ y1   T(s1); h  h0:
(30)
12As in the previous case, B0 =  B=q0, and hence the price level in state s1, P(s1), is

















The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2. The two period no-borrowing equilibrium has the following properties: (i) the
equilibrium consumption allocation/portfolio, fch
0;kh
0;bh
0;[ch(s1)]s12Sgh2[0;1], is given by (27)-
(30); (ii) the identity of the marginal buyer of government bonds, h0, is given by (26); and
(iii) the equilibrium price levels fP0;[P(s1)]s12Sg are given by (19) and (31).
3.3 Leveraged purchases of government bonds
We now consider a market structure where agents can borrow and lend to each other. Short
sales of government debt though are still prohibited. We refer to this specication as the
leverage specication. The leverage competitive equilibrium is also not Pareto Optimal but
produces dierent allocations from the no-borrowing specication.
In this market structure optimistic agents, who believe that the rate of return on gov-
ernment bonds is greater than the borrowing rate, want to borrow as much as possible and
purchase government bonds. Assume further that a borrower is required to post government
bonds as collateral in order to obtain a loan. How much can an agent borrow with one unit of
government bonds as collateral? One way to proceed would be to impose an exogenous ad hoc
constraint as in e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We pursue an alternative avenue that allows
us to determine the collateral constraint endogenously. Geanakoplos (2003, 2010) allows for a
broad array of loan/default schemes and determines which ones trade in equilibrium. In our
setting this can be summarized by a \no-default constraint," that requires that the amount
of repayments not exceed the value of the collateral in any state. We derive this result in the
Appendix and directly impose the no-default constraint here.
Since there is no default on loans, loans are risk-free. Thus the interest rate on loans is
equal to R in equilibrium (as long as the storage technology is used). Consider an agent who
borrows 0 and purchases government bonds b0 in period 0. She must repay R0 in period
1. The no-default constraint requires that R0  b0
P(s1), for all s1 2 S. Thus the budget
13constraints for each agents become






+ y0 + 0; (32)
c(s1)  Rk0 +
b0
P(s1)




; s1 2 S; (34)
c0;k0;b0;c(s1)  0; s1 2 S: (35)
Denition 3 (Leverage Competitive Equilibrium). Given a government policy (q0, TH, TL), a





supply of government bonds B0, and prices fP0, [P(s1)]s12Sg such that (i) for each agent




0g solves her utility maximization problem; (ii) the
government 
ow budget constraints (2)-(3) are satised, where taxes fT0;[T(s1)]s12Sg are
given by (4)-(5); and (iii) all markets clear, i.e., equations (9)-(11) hold and
R 1
0 h
0 dh = 0.
To characterize this equilibrium start with the utility maximization problem. No one
consumes in period 0: ch
0 = 0 for all h 2 [0;1]. Observe that P(U) < P(D) in equilibrium
and thus the collateral constraint (34) can be expressed as 0  b0
RP(D). In this setting there
will be a marginal purchaser h0 who is indierent between storage and borrowing and using









and is identical to (26). Optimistic agents h > h0 want to borrow as much as possible to
purchase government bonds. On the other hand, pessimistic agents h < h0 do not want to
hold government bonds. However, they are perfectly willing to lend to optimistic agents at
the interest rate R. Thus there will be leverage in equilibrium.
Given these results the solution to the utility maximization problem is summarized by:
ch














; h > h0;


















; h > h0;
 B























+ y1   T(s1); h  h0:
(40)
14Since storage and lending are perfect substitutes, only kh
0   h
0 is determined for agents with
h  h0. Agents with h > h0 set storage to zero, kh





RP(D). As before, B0 and P(s1), s1 2 S, are determined by (18) and (19). Then it
follows from (38) that the market clearing condition for government bonds is expressed as
 B
q0












Given P(s1), s1 2 S, the initial price level P0 and the marginal agent h0 are determined as
the solution to (36) and (41). The following proposition summarizes these results.





0, [ch(s1)]s12Sgh2[0;1], is given by (37)-(40); (ii) the marginal
buyer of government bonds, h0, is given by (36); and (iii) the equilibrium price levels fP0,
[P(s1)]s12Sg are given by (19) and (41).
3.4 Numerical example
We now turn to consider a particular thought exercise that is aimed to help us understand
how the in
ation rate evolves in each of these specications when agents begin to expect that
there is a possibility of a debt crisis.
We set the parameter values as  B = 1, y0 = y1 = 1, q0 = 1, R = 1:02, TH = R2, and
TL = TH=2. The choice of a gross nominal interest rate of one is chosen to re
ect the current
situation in Japan and the United States.
Suppose that in all periods prior to period zero the gross nominal interest rate is one and
everyone believes that s1 = U with probability one. That is, prior to period 0, no one believes
that a debt crisis will occur. Under these assumptions it follows that P 1 = 1. Since q 1 = 1
the in
ation rate in period -1 is given by  1 = q 1=R   1 =  1:96 percent. Suppose next
that in period zero agents become worried that a debt crisis may occur in period one and that
they have dierent degrees of condence about this possibility.
Table 1 shows the in
ation rate at t =  1, t = 0 and at s1 = D for the \complete markets,"
\no borrowing," and \leverage" specications, respectively. The in
ation rate in period zero,
0, is highest in the model with complete markets and lowest in the model with leverage.
This ranking is reversed in period one if state D is realized and the debt crisis occurs. (D)
is highest with leverage and lowest with complete markets.
In the complete markets specication when the news about a future crisis arrives in period
zero these beliefs are instantly re
ected in the price level and the in
ation rate jumps up to
a value of 30.72 percent. The in
ation rate also jumps up in the leverage specication. But
15the size of the jump in period zero is much smaller as compared to the complete markets
specication. Instead there is a much larger jump in the in
ation rate in the state where the
debt crisis occurs.
There is simple intuition behind this result. In the model with complete markets, every
agent can freely bet on her beliefs: optimistic agents buy the Arrow security U and sell Arrow
security D, and pessimistic agents do the opposite. A unique feature of the complete markets
specication is that by betting against the perceived low probability state agents can commit
to deliver their future endowment if that state occurs. In the other two specications they
cannot make this promise. In the no-borrowing equilibrium agents can only choose how to
save in the form of bonds or storage. In the leverage equilibrium optimistic agents can also
undertake collateralized borrowing which makes it possible for them to promise to deliver the
return on government bonds in period one and thereby mimic a purchase of Arrow security U.
However, they are not able to mimic a sale of Arrow security D. For pessimistic agents the
problem is more severe as there is no way for them to mimic either selling the Arrow security
U or purchasing the Arrow security D.
The inability of agents to promise their period 1 endowment results in a higher value
of h0 in the no-borrowing and leverage specications. This translates into a lower in
ation
rate 0 compared to the case with complete markets. The asymmetry between optimists and
pessimists in the leverage specication enhances these eects and that specication delivers
the lowest in
ation rate in period zero.
4 T-period model
In this section we shall see that the eect of the asset market structure on the dynamics of
the in
ation rate becomes more apparent when the time horizon is extended.
Suppose that there are T+1 periods indexed by t = 0;1;:::;T. In each period t = 1;:::;T,
a shock st 2 S = fU;Dg is realized. For t = 1;:::;T, let st = (s1;:::;st) 2 St denote the
history of shocks, and also let s0  0 and S0  f0g. In each period t, regardless of the history
st, agent h believes that st+1 = U with probability h and st+1 = D with probability 1   h.














h(st 1); if st = U,
(1   h)
h(st 1); if st = D,
with 
h(s0)  1.
In each period t, all agents are endowed with equal amounts of the consumption good,





y0; for t = 0,
0; for all st with t = 1;:::;T   1,
yT; for all sT.
In addition, at the beginning of period 0, all agents are endowed with equal amounts of
government debt  B > 0.
As in the two-period model, the government species a scal policy which consists of a
state-contingent path of lump-sum taxes fT(st) : st 2 St; t = 0;:::;Tg. To be specic, scal





0; for all st with t = 0;:::;T   1,
TL; for sT = DT,
TH; for all sT 6= DT.
(43)
The government also chooses a monetary policy which is a state-contingent path of the price
of government bonds, fq(st) : st 2 St; t = 0;:::;Tg. Given these government policies, the
government debt B(st) evolves as
 B = q0B0; (44)
B(st 1) = q(st)B(st); st 2 St; t = 1;:::;T   1; (45)
B(sT 1) = P(sT)T(sT); sT 2 ST: (46)
Figure 2 illustrates the implications of these assumptions using an event tree for the special
case where T = 2. A debt crisis only occurs when the government collects TL taxes in the
nal period. Under our assumption (43), it occurs only if st = D for all t = 1;:::;T. In
the case of T = 2 illustrated in the gure this corresponds to the bottom outcome where the
history is fD;Dg. In the other three histories in the last period there is no crisis. For general
T there will only be one history in the nal period that produces a crisis. From this it follows
that extending the horizon acts to lower the perceived probability of a crisis.
174.1 Complete markets
Let q(st+1jst) denote the price of the Arrow security traded at st that pays o one unit of
account if and only if st+1 occurs in the next period. With a complete set of Arrow securities,
the 
ow budget constraints for each agent are given by




































+ Rk(sT 1) + yT   T(sT); sT 2 ST; (49)
c(st);k(st);b(st)  0; st 2 St; t = 0;:::;T; (50)
where b(st+1jst) denotes the quantities of the Arrow securities purchased at st, and b(st)
denotes the quantities of government bonds purchased at st.
Given a policy (fq(st)g;TH;TL), a competitive equilibrium is dened as in the two-period
case.
It is also interesting to understand how the identity of the marginal buyer evolves along





; t = 1;2;:::;T; (51)
with h0 = 1=2. A proof of this result can be found in the Appendix.
184.2 Leveraged purchases of government bonds
Now suppose that Arrow securities are no longer traded, and borrowing is limited by the
no-default condition. The 
ow budget constraints for agents are






+ y0 + 0; (52)














; t = 0;:::;T   1; st 2 St; st+1 2 S; (55)
c(st);k(st);b(st)  0; st 2 St; t = 0;:::;T; (56)
4.3 Two additional numerical examples
We now consider two further numerical examples that illustrate how the properties of the
model change when the time horizon is extended. In the rst example all uncertainty is
resolved at the end of period two. In the second example the economy ends at the end of
period ve.
We consider the same parameterization of the model as before. Let  B = 1, y0 = yT = 1,
q(st) = 1 for all st and t, R = 1:02, TH = RT+1, and TL = TH=2. Also, assume that in period
-1, everyone believes that Pr(sT = DT) = 0, that is, everyone believes that the government
collects taxes of amount TH in period T for sure. It follows that P 1 = 1. Recall also that
 1 =  1:96 percent.
Table 2 contains results for the three period model. The rst two columns report  1, the
in
ation rate in period -1, and 0, the in
ation rate in period zero. Columns three and four
report the in
ation rate in particular states. Column three reports its value in period one
when the realization is D and column four reports the value of the in
ation rate in period
two when the realization is fD;Dg. The nal two columns of this table report the identity of
the marginal purchaser in period zero and in period one when the state is D.
Consider rst the results for complete markets. For this parameterization of the model
the in
ation rate jumps from -1.96 percent to 17.65 percent in period zero when individuals
realize that there is a possibility of a debt crisis. As compared to Table 1, the size of the
jump in the in
ation rate in period zero is now smaller. For all agents the possibility of a
scal crisis is lower when the model has three periods. It is now (1   h)2 as compared to
19(1 h) before. The size of the jump in period zero at 17.65 percent is still very large. Notice
also that the jump if the crisis state is realized in the nal period, (D2), is smaller when the
horizon is extended by one period. Extending the horizon tends to smooth out the in
ation
response in the complete markets specication.
It is also interesting to consider the dynamics of the marginal buyer. In the two period
model the marginal buyer is h0 = 1=2 or the midpoint of the interval. This continues to be
the case in the three period model. In period 1 when the state D is realized the net worth of
the optimistic individuals with h > h0 falls to zero. The remaining individuals with positive
net worth enter into new agreements and it follows from equation (51) that the new marginal
purchaser is h(D) = 1=3.
Observe next that the properties of the model are very dierent when we use the market
structure with leverage. The size of the in
ation rate response is now very small (-1.09 percent)
when the news arrives in period zero. For purposes of comparison, in the two period model
in
ation increased to 9.46 percent in period zero. This response is also qualitatively quite
dierent from the complete markets specication. In the specication with leverage there is
still de
ation immediately after the news arrives whereas with complete markets the in
ation
rate is very large and positive. A further distinction between the two period and three period
model is that the in
ation rate is now slightly lower in the nal period. In the two period
model it is 75.62 percent in the nal period in the three period model it falls to 71.89 percent.
However, the gap between the in
ation rate in the nal period and the in
ation rate in period
zero is now larger.
A further important distinction between the two market structures relates to the dynamics
of the marginal buyer. For complete markets we know from (51) that the marginal buyer in
period zero is always h0 = 1=2 regardless of the number of periods in the model. In the
leverage specication the opposite is the case. The identity of the marginal buyer in period
zero increases as the number of periods in the model is increased. Suppose next that we follow
the path leading to the crisis state and consider the period prior to the crisis. Along this leg
of the event tree we see that the identity of the marginal buyer in the three period model,
0:75, is quite close to the identity of the marginal buyer in the two period model, 0:79.
Taken together these results suggest that increasing the horizon acts to reduce the impact
response of in
ation at the time news arrives about the possibility of a future crisis and
concentrate its response in the crisis state.
To make this point more transparent we report results for the model with a six period
planning horizon in Figure 3. Figure 3 plots the in
ation rate for the complete markets spec-
ication and the leverage specication. Observe that for the complete markets specication
20the smoothing property is more pronounced. The in
ation rate now jumps to 7 percent in
period zero and then rises slowly but steadily to a maximum of about 14 percent.
The concentration of in
ation in the crisis state that occurs in the leverage specication
is much more pronounced in the six period model. In fact, there is no longer a discernible
jump in the in
ation rate in period zero.5 We previously saw in the three period model that
the in
ation rate turned positive in period 1. Here we can see very clearly that increasing the
horizon acts to delay the response of the in
ation rate. In period 3, for instance, the in
ation
rate is still very low at -1.01 percent. It is only in period four that we see a substantial increase
in the in
ation rate to 10.97 percent. The biggest increase is concentrated in the nal period
when the crisis state is realized (71.57 percent). This is very close to the value of the in
ation
rate in the crisis state in the three period model (71.89 percent).
This fact can be related to the identity of the marginal buyer in the period before the
crisis. For the three period model her identify was (about) 0.75. Interestingly, her identity
is also about 0.75 in the six period model. This is why the nal period in
ation rate is very
similar in the two simulations.
5 Explicit default
We now turn to consider a setting with explicit default and long-term debt. We will assume
that this is the only way default can occur. In particular, price levels fP(st)g are now
given exogenously and thus the price level is no longer determined by scal policy. These
assumptions are designed to re
ect the situation of a small country (or state) that is a member
of a currency union.
Let  B be the face value of government debt in period 0 and suppose that it does not
issue any new debt in any other period. All government debt is long-term and matures in the
last period, T. Moreover, suppose that the government only collects taxes in the last period.
Under these assumptions the nominal outstanding value of government debt is  B in all but
the last period.
As before, a shock st 2 fU;Dg is realized in each period t. The government defaults in
period T only if sT = DT; it repays the full amount of  B otherwise. When the government
defaults, it repays only a fraction  2 (0;1) of  B. It follows that the amount of taxes collected
5Using Matlab the increase in the size of the in
ation rate between period -1 and zero is 2e-014 which is
close to the limits of machine precision.





where (sT) is dened as
(sT) =
(
; if sT = DT,
1; otherwise.
In the complete markets specication, the 
ow budget constraints for each agent are given
by



































+ Rk(sT 1) + yT   T(sT); sT 2 ST;
c(st);k(st);b(st)  0; st 2 St; t = 0;:::;T;
The market clearing condition is
Z 1
0
bh(st)dh =  B; for all st 2 St and t = 0;:::;T   1,
Z 1
0








(ch(st) + kh(st))dh =
Z 1
0
Rkh(st 1)dh; for all st 2 St and t = 0;:::;T   1,
Z 1
0
ch(sT)dh = yT +
Z 1
0
Rkh(sT 1)dh; for all sT 2 ST.
22In the leverage specication, the 
ow budget constraints are given by






+ y0 + 0;


















; sT 1 2 ST 1; sT 2 S;
c(st);k(st);b(st)  0; st 2 St; t = 0;:::;T:
The market clearing conditions have a similar form to before.
Suppose that the nominal interest rate in the world is constant and given by 1= q. It follows
that the price level evolves as Pt+1=Pt = 1=(R q). In the following numerical example, we set
 q = R = 1:02; y0 = yT =  B = 1;  = 0:2. Let (Dt) denote the log yield of the government








; t = 0;:::;T   1:
As before, we assume that prior to period 0, everyone believes that the probability of the
government defaulting is zero, that is, (sT) = 1 for all sT. It follows that the log yield in
period t =  1,  1, is equal to  ln( q).
Table 3 reports results for the complete markets and the leverage specications for the
case where T = 4. Consider the complete markets specication rst. When the news arrives
in period zero the prospect of a future default on the long-term bond produces a jump in
its yield from 1.98 percent to 6.34 percent. As before the marginal buyer h0 = 1=2. Along
the path towards default h(Dt) falls in exactly the same way as before, at the rate 1=(t + 2).
Along the path to default optimistic agents from the previous period get wiped out when the
D event is realized. They have zero wealth and are inactive in subsequent periods along this
path. The result is that h(Dt) falls quickly. A lower value of h(Dt) implies successively lower
prices on government debt or alternatively higher yields.
In the leverage specication there is once again a delayed response. In period zero h0 is
virtually one and the yield on the long term bond does not respond to the news. Along the
path leading to default optimistic individuals experience a gradual tightening in the amount
23that they can borrow as the price of the long-term bond increases. However, optimistic agents
continue to be active and the declines in h(Dt) are much smaller here as compared to the
complete markets case. This results in a higher price (lower yield) on the long term bond in
all periods along this path relative to the complete markets benchmark.
6 Discussion
The results we have presented are based on a very stark model that is designed to capture
the essential features of the world we are attempting to model. We believe though that these
results also apply in more general and complex environments. We now turn to discuss the
robustness of our ndings to some of our principal assumptions.
The single most important assumption driving our results is the restriction on short sales
of government debt. It is well known that some institutional investors take short positions on
sovereign debt. However, the data presented in Table 4 indicates that the nancial sector as
a whole has a very large long position in government debt in both the U.S. and Japan.
Table 4 provides data on ownership of government debt in these two countries. In the U.S.,
nancial institutions hold 68 percent of total outstanding privately held debt.6 In Japan the
ratio is even higher. Almost 84 percent of privately held debt is held by nancial institutions.
Another piece of evidence that suggests that nancial frictions on short sales of government
debt are signicant is the gap on mortgage and government bond rates. If it was cheap to
short sovereign debt this would be a much cheaper way to nance a mortgage. Table 5 reports
spreads of government bond yields and mortgage rates for the U.S. and Japan at alternative
maturities. U.S. spreads range from a high of 2.84 percent to 0.51 percent. In Japan they
range from 1.22 percent to 0.46 percent. Loan origination costs increase the gap even further.
Finally it is not unusual for governments to introduce a state dependent form of restriction
on short sales that make it more dicult to short government debt in states of nature where
the risk of default is elevated. For instance, in August of 2011 as risk premia on their sovereign
debt shot up governments in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain all imposed bans on short sales.
According to the results in Section 5 these actions are an eective way to lower yields. In our
current model though they have no implications for the probability of default.
A second issue relates to the specic motives of why particular individuals/sectors take
long leveraged positions in government debt when the risk of a crisis increases. The model
relies on heterogeneous beliefs to generate dierences in demand for government debt. Our
6Our denition of privately held is based on the depositor. Thus we classify public pension plans and central
bank holdings as part of privately held debt.
24results would also go through if these dierences in demand were produced by alternative
dierences in preferences such as dierences in risk aversion. Government debt is risky and
safe storage is not. With dierences in risk aversion less risk averse individuals will borrow
from the high risk averse types to purchase more government debt.
In the real world leveraged purchases of government debt are central to nancial interme-
diation. To see why this is the case consider the following strategy that optimistic individuals
undertake in our economy: borrow from pessimistic individuals and use these resources to
purchase government debt. In the real world this is a central role of the nancial services
sector: it accepts deposits and purchases government debt. Institutional restrictions such as
capital requirements provide specic incentives for banks to behave in this way. If a bank uses
any new deposits it receives to purchase government bonds, this increases tier one capital and
thereby helps a bank to meet its capital requirements. Another institutional constraint applies
to public pension plans which are required to take long leveraged positions on government
debt.
We have assumed in the numerical examples that q(st) = 1 for all st or that the nominal
interest rate is zero in all histories. That assumption was made to capture the current situ-
ations of Japan and the U.S. However, this assumption is not essential to our results. Our




In this paper we have described the evolution of in
ation in an economy that faces a surprise
increase in the risk of a sovereign debt crisis. A debt crisis is a situation where taxes remain
low and the government budget constraint can only be satised by a large increase in the price
level which de
ates the real value of government liabilities. We have found that if markets
are complete the in
ation rate jumps on the date that the risk of a crisis is perceived to
increase and remains high. We also described an alternative market structure with short sale
restrictions. Our principal result is that under this alternative there is no discernible impact
response of the in
ation rate to an increase in the risk of default. In
ationary pressure can
remain low for many periods and becomes concentrated in the states of nature where the
crisis occurs. In short, the message of our paper is that the fact that the in
ation rate is low
today does not mean that the risk of a future crisis is low.
We also considered a setting with long-term government debt and explicit default. Our
results suggest that actions by governments to rule out short selling of government debt are,
25in principal, an eective way to reduce the response of prices. However, in our model the
default event is not eected by these actions. In our future work we plan to consider settings
where the probability of default is endogenous such as in Bi (2011) or Davig, Leeper and
Walker (2011).
8 Appendix
8.1 Equilibrium level of leverage
Here we follow Geanakoplos (2003, 2010) and discuss how the equilibrium level of leverage
is determined in our model. Consider the two period model in which a variety of loans are
traded in period zero. The unit of each loan is normalized so that one unit of each loan
requires one unit of collateral (government debt). One unit of type j loan is a promise to pay
j units of goods in period one. All loans are assumed to be non-recourse. It follows that the
actual repayment made in period one by an agent who obtains a unit of type j loan repays
in period zero is fj;1=P(s1)g for each s1 2 S. Let J denote the set of loans traded in period
0, which is assumed to be nite. We assume that
j  1=P(D) 2 J:
Note that the loan of type j corresponds to the loan considered in the main text. Here we
show that only loans of type j are traded in equilibrium.
Let j;0 be the price of a unit of type j loan in period 0, and aj;0 be the amount of type j
loan obtained in period 0. Then the budget constraints for each agent can be expressed as
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Without loss of generality, we assume that j < 1=P(U) for all j 2 J. We use the no-









26Next consider loans of type j 2 (1=P(D);1=P(U)). One unit of such a loan yields j in state
U and 1=P(D) in state D. It is thus equivalent to the following portfolio: (i) obtain x units



































Now let us examine the demand and supply of each type of loans. Let us start with loans
of type j  j = 1=P(D). These loans are risk-free and their rate of return is R. Thus, agents
h  h0 are indierent across these types of loans. For agents h > h0, the interest rate on these
loans is less than their expected rate of return on government debt. If agent h obtains one
unit of type j  j loan and purchase one unit of government debt, she obtains 1=P(s1)   j





























P(U) + (1   h0) 1
P(D)   j;
for j  j and h > h0, where the inequality is strict for j < j. It follows that agents h > h0
strictly prefers loans of type j to loans of type j < j.










hj + (1   h) 1
P(D)
h0j + (1   h0) 1
P(D)
< R; for h  h0 and j > j.
That is, agents h  h0 strictly prefers providing loans of type j to providing loans of type
j > j. On the other hand, if agent h obtains one unit of type j > j loan and purchase one












27which is independent of j. Thus, agents h > h0 are indierent among loans of type j  j.
The above argument proves that only type j loans are traded in equilibrium. This
completes the proof.
8.2 Marginal agents in the complete-markets specication
Here we prove that the marginal buyers at history Dt, h(Dt), is 1=(t + 2) in the complete-
markets specication. With complete markets, we can write the present-value budget con-


























and q(sujst) is dened as
q(sujst) = q(st+1jst)    q(sujsu 1):
Note that at each history st, Wh(st) is either 0 or some constant  W(st) > 0, which does not
depend on h.
Let us restrict attention to the histories of the form st = Dt, t = 0;:::;T   1. Note that
Wh(Dt+1) =
(
0; for h > h(Dt),
 W(Dt+1); for h  h(Dt),
Wh(Dt;U) =
(
0; for h = 2 [h(Dt);h(Dt 1)],
 W(Dt;U); for h 2 [h(Dt);h(Dt 1)].
Furthermore, we have
































































which implies h0 = 1=2. As a result, we obtain h(Dt) = 1=(t + 2). This completes the proof.
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31Table 1: In
ation rates (%) and marginal buyers in the two-period model
 1 0 (D) h0
(1) complete markets -1.96 30.72 47.06 0.5
(2) no borrowing -1.96 25.57 53.09 0.56
(3) leverage -1.96 9.46 75.62 0.79
Table 2: In
ation rates (%) and marginal buyers in the three-period model
 1 0 (D) (D2) h0 h(D)
(1) complete markets -1.96 17.65 22.55 30.72 0.50 0.33
(2) leverage -1.96 -1.09 10.86 71.89 0.94 0.75
Table 3: Log yields in the ve-period model (%)
 1 0 (D) (D2) (D3)
(1) complete markets 1.98 6.34 14.84 34.68 104.15
(2) leverage 1.98 1.98 2.05 5.04 38.70
32Amount Fraction
(trillion $) (%, net of govt)
Total 14.03
Government 6.17
Individuals and non-financial companies 1.41 12.4
Domestic Financial Institutions 5.38 47.2
Private 1.82 16.0
Public 2.44 21.4
Central Bank 1.11 9.8
Foreign sector 4.44 38.9
Amount Fraction
(trillion yen) (%, net of govt)
Total 936.63
Government 114.04
Individuals and non-financial companies 75.88 9.2
Domestic Financial Institutions 687.45 83.6
Private 354.27 43.1
Public 268.06 32.6
Central Bank 65.12 7.9
Foreign sector 59.26 7.2
Holdings  of U.S. Government Debt
End of Calendar year 2010
Holdings  of Japanese Government Debt
End of fiscal year 2008
Table 4
33U.S.   
(Percentage)
Japan   
(Percentage)
1- Year ARM 2.84 0.86
5/1-year ARM 1.92 1.22
15-Year Fixed 0.5125 n.a.
20-Year Fixed n.a. 0.47
30-Year Fixed 1.06 0.46
*Government debt yields and
U.S. Mortgage rates are from Bloomberg.
Japan Mortgage rates are from Shinsei Bank.
Spreads on Mortgage Rates over 
Government Debt in U.S. and Japan
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Figure 2: The event tree for the case where T = 2
















Figure 3: The in
ation rate for the complete markets and leverage specications when T = 5.
37